AGREEMENTS OPPOSED TO PUBLIC
POLICY
INTRODUCTION
"Public Policy is
an unruly horse, and when you get astride it you never know where it will carry
you."[1]
The
term ‘public policy’ is not capable of being defined with any degree of
precision because ‘public policy’, in its nature, is highly uncertain and
fluctuating. It keeps on varying with the habits and fashions of the day, with
the growth of commerce and usage of trade. In simple words, it may be said that
an agreement which conflicts with morals of the time and contravenes any
established interest of society, it is void as being against public policy.
Thus, an agreement which tends to be injurious to the public or against the
public good is void as being opposed to public. According to F. Pollock,
“Agreements may offend against the public policy, or tend to the prejudice of
the State in time of war (trading with the enemies, etc.), by tending to the
perversion or abuse of municipal justice, (stifling prosecution, champerty,
maintenance) or in private life by attempting to impose inconvenient and
unreasonable restrictions on the free choice of individuals in marriage or
their liberty to exercise any lawful trading or calling.”
Illegality
is a highly complex area of contract law. It deals with both criminal conduct,
conduct prohibited by statute (even if not criminal) and conduct regarded as
contrary to public policy. In some cases it will be simple to determine whether
or not an illegal contract exists and will be rendered void; for example, a
contract whereby A agrees to pay B 1million dollar if B kills C will be clearly be considered
illegal and void. In other cases it will be more difficult. For example, will a
transport contract be rendered illegal if the car used in the transport speeds
while on its journey? In some cases a contract tainted by incidental illegality
might be considered unenforceable rather than void so that proprietary
interests might pass notwithstanding the unlawful conduct.
Statutory illegality
- this encompasses contracts directly prohibited by statute (eg, cartel
contracts), contracts entered into for an illegal purpose (eg, to kill),
contracts performed illegality (eg, speeding whilst driving in the course of
performing a contract) and contracts otherwise made void by statute (eg,
certain unfair terms in consumer contracts). Different rules and consequences
attach to each.
Common law illegality and contracts
which are contrary to public policy - this encompasses a
broader range of conduct, including contracts prejudicial to the administration
of justice, contracts promoting corruption in public life, contracts
prejudicing the status of marriage, contracts promoting sexual immorality and
contracts in restraint of trade. It is not always easy to classify these types
of contract and what constitutes conduct that is contrary to 'public policy'
varies with the prevailing morality of the relevant jurisdiction.
Where
conduct is classified as illegal or contrary to public policy it is generally
held to be unenforceable; there are, however, some exceptions to that rule and,
in some cases, it may be possible to sever the offending terms and enforce the
remainder of the contract.
An agreement is unlawful if the Court regards
it opposed to public policy. What is public policy? Public policy means policy
of the law or the Government for the public good or welfare. Every Government
tries to maximize the welfare of its citizens. Therefore, it makes a policy to
discourage or prohibit any thing which is against the welfare or interest of
society. For example, trading with enemy, selling of public offices, agreement
restraining people from carrying on lawful trade, etc. are injurious to
society. Hence, they are considered as opposed to public policy and have been
declared void.
The
concept of public policy has invited a lot of criticism. The reason is that
this concept is very vague. There is a danger of it being misused. It is for
this reason it has been remarked by Lord Halsbury that categories of public
policies are closed and a Court cannot invent a new head of public policy.
In the case of Richardson v.
Mellish "[2]...It
is a very unruly horse, and when once you get astride it you never know where
it will carry you." Again Lord Davy in the case of Janson v. Driefontein
Consolidated Mines Ltd. remarked "[3]...public
policy is always an unsafe and treacherous ground for legal decision."
According to Lord Atkin "The doctrine should only be invoked in clear
cases in which the harm to the public is substantially incontestable, and does
not depend upon the idiosyncratic inference of a few judicial minds." (Fender
v. St. John Mildmay)[4]
Agreements which have been declared
against public policy by the Courts are as follows:
Agreements
for trading with an enemy:
All contracts made with
an alien (foreigner) enemy are illegal unless made with the permission of the
Government. An alien enemy is a person who owes allegiance to a Government at
war with India. Such agreements are illegal on the ground of public policy because
either the further performance of the contract would involve intercourse with
the enemy or its continued existence would confer upon the enemy an immediate
or future benefit.
A
restraint on trade is a promise by one party, the covenantor, to give up a
freedom that he would otherwise enjoy in relation to his or her trade, for the
benefit of another party, the covenantee: Amoco
Aust v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co.[5]
Trading
activities will include employment, operating a business and restrictive practices
such as agreeing to obtain supplies exclusively from one supplier for a lengthy
period of time.
While prima facie all restraints of trade are void, a
restraint is valid if it can be shown to be reasonable in the interests of (Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and
Ammunition):[6]
- The
parties
- The
public
The responsibility is on the covenantee to show the
restraint is reasonable in the interests of the parties. If successful, it will
shift to the covenantor to show that it is unreasonable in the interest of the
public: Amoco Aust v Rocca Bros Motor
Engineering Co.[7]
The validity of a restraint must be decided as at the date of the
agreement: Lindner v Murdock's Garage.[8]
Agreements
interfering with administration of justice:
No
one is allowed to interfere with administration of justice. These are of the
following types:
(a)
Agreements stifling prosecution:
Stifling
implies abuse of law. The law does not permit a person to make money out of a
crime. You shall not make a trade of a felony. It is based on the noble
doctrine that if a person has committed a crime, he must be tried by a Court of
law and if found guilty, must be punished. Contract for compounding or
suppression of criminal charges, for offences of a public nature are illegal
and void. The law is “you cannot make a trade of your felony (crime). You
cannot convert crime into a source of profit.” The underlying principle is ‘If
the accused is innocent, the law is abused for the purpose of extortion; if
guilty, the law is eluded by a corrupt compromise screening the criminal for a
bribe.
Example:
A
promises to drop prosecution which he has instituted against B for robbery, and
B promises to restore the stolen property, the agreement is unlawful.
However,
compoundable offence under the Indian Penal Code can be compromised. Again,
there is no bar to refer a dispute to arbitration if it is of civil nature.
(b)
Maintenance and Champerty:
These
two terms are used in English Law. Maintenance implies assisting or financing
of suits by third parties having no real interest, for its prosecution or
defense. Champerty implies a bargain by which one party is to assist the other
in recovering property, and is to share in the proceeds of the action. Thus
maintenance and champerty are likely to encourage purposeless, mis-chievous and
retaliatory litigation. Hence both of these are illegal under English Law.
In
India, maintenance and champerty are not necessarily void. An agreement to be
champertous in India must be grossly unfair on unconscionable ground or opposed
to public policy. Thus an agreement to share the proceeds of litigation if
recovered in consideration of other party's supplying the funds in good faith
to continue the litigation is not in itself opposed to public policy. However,
where the advances are made by way of gambling in litigation, the agreement to
share the proceeds of litigation is opposed to public policy and hence void.
‘Maintenance’ means the
promotion of litigation in which a person has no interest of his own. In other
words, where a person agrees to maintain a suit, in which[9] he
has no interest, the proceeding is known as ‘Maintenance.’ Thus, ‘maintenance’
tends to encourage speculative litigation. ‘Champerty’ is a bargain
whereby one party is to assist another in recovering property and, in turn, is
to share in the proceeds of the action. Under English Law, both of these
agreements are declared illegal and void being opposed to public policy. Indian
Law is different.
In
Raja Venkata Subhadrayamma Guru v. Sree Pusapathi Venkatapathi Raju,[10]
the Privy Council held that champerty and maintenance are not illegal in India,
and that Courts will refuse to enforce such agreements only when they are found
to be extortionate and unconscionable and not made with the bonafide object
of assisting the claims of the person unable to carry on litigation himself. In
other words, only those agreements which appear to be made for purposes of
gambling in litigation, and for injuring or oppressing others, by encouraging
unholy litigation, that will not be enforced, but not all agreements of
champerty or maintenance. Thus, an agreement to render services for the conduct
of litigation in consideration of payment of 50 per cent of the amount
recovered through Court would be legally enforceable. But, where it was found
that the value of the part of the estate promised to be conveyed amounted to
Rs. 64,000 in return for Rs. 12,000 which was to be spent by the financier on
the prosecution of an appeal in the Privy Council, it was held that although
the agreement was bond fide, it could not be enforced, the reward being
extortionate and unconscionable.
An
agreement to transfer % share in the property, if recovered, has been held to
be champertous and hence void. Nuthaki
Venkatswami v. Katta Nagi[11]
Agreements
which interfere with administration of justice:
No
one is allowed to interfere with the course of justice. Hence an agreement
which interferes with administration of justice is unlawful.
Examples:
(1)
A agrees to pay a bribe of Rs. 1,000 to a judge. It is unlawful and hence void.
(2)
A agrees to pay fee to a holy man to pray for the success of his suit. It is
not interference with the administration of justice. Hence it is valid and
binding. Balasundara Mudaliar v. Mohd.
Usman[12]
Agreements to vary period of limitation:
An
agreement to defeat the object of any law is unlawful. Hence an agreement to
vary the period of limitation will be void as it would defeat the object of the
law of limitation. According to the law of limitation, an action for breach of
a contract must be brought within three years from the date of its breach. Thus
an agreement to make this period longer or shorter than three years will be
void. However, in practice this has not been applied strictly by law Courts in
India. For example, a clause providing that "no suit shall be brought
against the company in connection with the said policy later than one year
after the time when the cause of action accrues" was up held.
Agreements for the Sale of Public
Offices and Titles. Traffic
by way of sale in public offices and appointments obviously tends to the
prejudice of the public service by interfering with the selection of the best
qualified persons. Such sales, are, therefore, unlawful and void. The secretary
of a college promised Col. Parkinson that if he made a large donation to the
college, he would secure a knighthood for him. Held, the agreement was
against public policy and thus void (Parkinson v. College of
Ambulance Ltd. (1925) 2 K.B.1)[13]
Traffic
in public offices
It
implies transfer of public office for some consideration or inducing public
officers to act for consideration in cash or kind. Such agreements are contrary
to public policy as these are likely to encourage corruption or inefficiency
among the officials. Hence such agreements are void.
Examples:
(1)
A agrees with B to procure a job in Union Public Service Commission for a
consideration of Rs. 1,000. It is void.
(2)
A agrees to transfer to B his post in a Government office for Rs. 5,000, it is
void.
Threat
to termination of service as it was observed in the case of (Shushil Kumar Yadunath jha v.union of
India)[14]
Agreements
creating interest opposed to duty:
Duty
must be done. Therefore, such agreements are also likely to increase corruption
and inefficiency among the officials. Hence such agreements are void.
Example:
A
agrees to pay Rs. 500 to a Municipal Engineer not to report unauthorized
construction to the Municipal Authorities. The agreement is void as it will
create interest opposed to duty.
Agreement restraining personal freedom:
Under
contract act personal freedom has been guaranteed by our Constitution. The law
will not allow an agreement which takes away the personal liberty of a person.
Recently, Government has done away with bonded labour to ensure this freedom.
Examples:
An
agreement by a borrower with a money-lender that he will not change his
residence, employment or agree to a reduction of his salary without the written
consent of the moneylender was declared void. Harwood v. Millers Timber & Trading Co.[15] An
agreement by a borrower to do manual work for the creditor so long as the debt
was not paid in full is void.
7.
Agreements interfering with parental rights and duties:
Guardianship
rights cannot be allowed to be sold away or transferred in public interest. Children's/ward's
interest should be properly protected. Accordingly, law has vested this
authority in the parents of children. Father is the lawful guardian of his
.minor child. In the absence of father, this right is transferred to the
mother.
Agreements
in restraint of parental rights. According to law the
father is the guardian of his minor child; after the father, the right of
guardianship vests in the mother. This right cannot be bartered away by any
agreement. Re Caroll (1931) 1 K.B.
307. Thus, the authority of a father cannot be alienated irrevocably and
any agreement purporting to do so is void.
Example:
A
father having two minor sons agreed to transfer their guardianship in favour of
Mrs. Annie Besant and also agreed not to revoke the transfer. Subsequently, he
filed a suit for recovery of the boys and a declaration that he was the
rightful guardian, the Court held that he had the right to revoke his authority
and get back the children (Giddu Narayanish v. Mrs. Annie Besant)[16].However,
a child validly adopted by a Hindu under the Adoption and Maintenance Act,
1956, cannot be taken back.
Agreement
interfering with marital status:
Agreements
interfering with marital status or duties are immoral Hence these have been
declared void.
Example:
A
lends Rs. 1,000 to a married woman to file a suit against her husband to get
divorce and marry him after the divorce. Agreement is void.
Agreement of marriage breakage or brokerage:
Everyone
has a liberty to marry according to his free choice. This free choice should
not be disturbed by monetary consideration or engaging paid brokers to procure
matches. A marriage brokerage contract is one in which, in consideration of
marriage, one or the other of the parties to it, or their parents or third
parties receive a certain sum of money. Accordingly, dowry is a marriage
brokerage and hence unlawful and void.
In Venkatakrishna
v. Venkatachalam[17]
a sum of money was agreed to be paid to the father in consideration of his
giving his daughter in marriage. Held,
such a promise amounted to a marriage brokerage contract and was void.
Where a purohit was promised a certain sum of
money in consideration of procuring a second wife for the defendant, it was
held that the promise was opposed to public policy and thus void [Vaidyanathan v. Gangarazu[18]
In
the above cases, if marriage had been performed and the money remains unpaid,
it cannot be recovered in a Court of Law. But, if the money had been paid and
marriage also performed, the money cannot be got back.
Example:
A
engaged a Panda from Hardwar to pay him (panda) Rs. 500 if the Panda procures
him a beautiful wife. It is void.
Forbidden by law:
If
the consideration or the object of an agreement is the doing of an act,
forbidden by law, the agreement is void. The act may be forbidden either under
the Indian Penal Code or by special legislation or regulations made by a
competent authority.Under Sec. 23, words ‘consideration’ and ‘object’ have not
been used as synonyms. Object means the purpose and design. In some cases,
consideration for an agreement may be lawful, but the purpose for which the
agreement was entered into may be unlawful.
However,
the agreement would be void. Therefore, both the consideration and object of an
agreement must be lawful; otherwise the agreement would be void.
Agreements
in restraint of legal proceedings.
Section
28, as amended by the Indian Contract (Amendment) Act, 1996 w.e.f 8.1.1997,
provides that every agreement—
·
By which any party thereto is restricted
absolutely from enforcing his rights under or in respect of any contract, by
the usual legal proceedings in the ordinary tribunals, or which limits the time
within which he may thus enforce his rights
·
Which extinguishes the rights of any party
thereto, or discharges any party thereto from any liability, under or in
respect of any contract on the expiry of a specified period so as to restrict
any party from enforcing his rights, is void to that extent.
However,
an agreement to refer disputes to arbitration is valid.
Similarly,
the Supreme Court in M/s. Angile Insulations v. M/s. Davy Ashmore
India Ltd.[19]
has held that an express agreement between parties to vest jurisdiction to
refer any dispute to a specified court does not amount to contracting against
the statute. Thus, the clause in the agreement, viz., and “This work order is
issued subject to the jurisdiction of the High Court situated in Bangalore, in
the State of Karnataka” was held to be valid. Supreme Court said ‘Mercantile
Law and Practice’ permit such agreements.
Agreements in Restraint of Trade. Courts
do not allow any tendency to impose restrictions upon the liberty of an
individual to carry on any business, profession or trade. In England, originally,
all agreements in restraint of trade were void. But now, the rule is that
though total restraint will be bad, reasonable restraint will be enforceable.
In Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt, etc., Co. (1893) A.C. 535, the
House of Lords held that “the real test for determining the validity of
agreements in restraint of trade was, whether the restraint imposed was
reasonable, for good consideration, not prejudicial to the interests of the
public, and not more onerous than necessary for the protection of the party
imposing the restraint”.
In
India, the law on the subject is contained in Section 27
which reads: “Every agreement by which any one is restrained from exercising a
lawful profession, trade or business of any kind, is to that extent void.”
Thus, in India, all agreements in restraint of trade, whether general or
partial, qualified or unqualified, are void. It is, therefore, not open to the
Courts in India to enter into any question of reasonableness or otherwise of
the restraint.[20]
29
out of 30 manufacturers of combs in the city of Patna agreed with R to
supply him with combs and not to anyone else. Under the agreement R was
free to reject the goods if he found there was no market for them. Held, the
agreement amounted to restraint of trade and was thus void[21]
J, an employee of a company, agreed not
to employ himself in a similar concern within adistance of 800 miles from
Madras after leaving the company’s service. Held, the agreement was void
[Oakes
& Co. v. Jackson (1876)
1 Mad. 134].
A and B carried on business of
braziers in a certain locality in Calcutta. A promised to stop business
in that locality if B paid him Rs. 900 which he had paid to his workmen
as advances. A stopped his business but B did not pay him the
promised money. Held, the agreement was void and, therefore, nothing
could be recovered on it [Madhav v. Raj Coomar (1874) 14 B.L.R. 76].
Conclusion
Exceptions
or Cases in which restraint of trade is valid in India.
The
following are the exceptions to the above rule that a restraint of trade is
void:
·
Sale of Goodwill. Exception
1 to Section 27 provides that the seller of the goodwill of a business may
agree with the buyer to refrain from carrying on a similar business, within
specified local limits, so long as the buyer or any one deriving title to the
goodwill from him carries on a like business, provided that such limits are
reasonable.
S,
a seller of imitation jewelry, sells his business to B and promises not
to carry on business in imitation jewelry and real jewelry. Held, the
restraint with regard to imitation jewellery was valid but not regarding real jewelry
(Goldsoll
v. Goldmand (1915)1
Ch.D. 292.)
·
Partners’ agreement. Partners
may agree that:
1.
A partner shall not
carry on any business other than that of the firm while he is a partner. [Section
11(2) of the Indian Partnership
Act, 1932]
2.
A partner on ceasing to
be a partner will not carry on any business similar to that of the firm within
a specified period or within specified local limits. The agreement shall be
valid if the restrictions are reasonable [Section 32(2) of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932]
3.
Partners may, upon or
in anticipation of the dissolution of the firm, make an agreement that some or
all of them will not carry on a business similar to that of the firm within a
specified period or within specified local limits and such agreement shall be valid
if the restrictions imposed are reasonable [Section 54 of the Indian Partnership Act, 1932]
4.
A partner may, upon the
sale of the goodwill of a firm, make an agreement that such partner will not
carry on any business similar to that of the firm within a specified period or
within specified local limits; and such agreement shall be valid if the
restrictions imposed are reasonable [Section 55 of the Indian Partnership, 1932].
·
Service Agreements. An
agreement of service by which a person binds himself during the term of the
agreement not to take service with anyone else or directly or indirectly take
part in or promote or aid any business in direct competition with that of his
employer is valid [Charles v. Macdonald (1899) 23 Bom. 103].
A
agreed
to become assistant for 3 years to B who was a doctor practicing at
Zanzibar. It was agreed that during the term of the agreement A was not
to practice on his own account in Zanzibar. After one year, A started
his own practice. Held, the agreement was valid and A could be
restrained by an injunction from doing so.[22]
These
days it is a common practice to appoint management trainees. A lot of time,
money and energy is spent in training the selected candidates in the management
techniques. So, it will be a waste on the part of such organizations if these
persons left for other organizations immediately after training. Therefore, a
service bond is normally got signed whereby the trainee agrees to serve the organization
for a stipulated period. Such agreements, if reasonable, do not amount, to
restraint of trade and hence are enforceable.
Thus,
where an employee undertook to serve his employer for a period of 3 years but
leaves the service after one year, he may be asked to abide by the agreement.[23]
But,
if a restraint imposed on the employee is to operate after the expiry of the
period of his service it shall prima facie be void [Krishna Murgai v. Superintendence Co. of India, AIR,
1979 Delhi 232].20 Thus, where A bank appoints an officer subject to the
condition that after ceasing to be in service he would not join the service of
any other bank in India for a period of 5 years, the bank shall not be in a
position to enforce such condition.
Effects
of Wagering Agreements.
An agreement by way of
wager is void. Section 30 provides “Agreements by way of wager are void; and no
suit shall be brought for recovering anything alleged to be won on any wager or
entrusted to any person to abide by the result of any game or other uncertain
event on which any wager is made”. Thus, in India all agreements by way of
wager are void. Wagering Agreement Void and not Illegal. In India,
unless the wager amounts to a lottery, which is a crime according to Section
294-A of the Indian Penal Code, it is not illegal but simply void. Thus, except
in case of lotteries, the collateral transactions remain enforceable.
4.
Contracts of Insurance. Contracts of insurance are not wagering
agreements even though the payment of money by the insurer may depend upon a
future uncertain event. Contracts of insurance differ from the wagering
agreements in the following respects:
1.
It is only person possessing an
insurable interest that is permitted to insure life or property, and not any
person, as in the case of a wager.
2.
In the case of fire and marine
insurance,[24]
only the actual loss suffered by the party is paid by the company, and not the
full amount for which the property is insured. Even in the case of life
insurance, the amount payable is fixed only because of the difficulty in
estimating the loss caused by the death of the assured in terms of money, but
the underlying idea is only indemnification.
3.
Contracts of insurance are regarded as
beneficial to the public and are, therefore, encouraged. Wagering agreements,
on the other hand, are considered to be against public policy.
APPENDIX
Cases Referred
1) Richardson v. Mellish (1824) 2 Bing. 252
2) Janson v. Driefontein Consolidated Mines Ltd.
(1902) A.C. 484
3) Fender v.Mildmay[1937] 3 All E.R. 402
4) Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty
Ltd. (1973) 133 CLR 288
5) Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co
Ltd [1894] AC 535
6) Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty
Ltd. (1973) 133 CLR 288
7) Lindner v Murdock's Garage (1950)
83 CLR 628(Australia)
8) Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi Dayal Sahu (1908) 35 I.A. 48: 35
Col. 4.
9) Raja Venkata Subhadrayamma Guru v.
Sree Pusapathi Venkatapathi Raju,
48 Mad. 230 (P.C.),
10) Nuthaki Venkataswami v. Katta NagiReddy (died), AIR 1962 Andh
Pra 457
11) Equivalent citations: 1968 AIR 1273, 1968 SCR (3)
428
12) St John Shipping Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd
[1957] 1 QB 267.
13) Shushil Kumar Yadunath jha v.union
of India AIR 1986 SC 1636,(1986) 3 SCC 325 at 328
14) Harwood
v. Millers Timber & Trading Co.
[1917] 1 KB 305
15) Giddu
Narayanish v. Mrs. Annie Besant.
(1915) 38 Mad. P.C
16) Also
Equivalent Citation: AIR
1915 Mad 756 (2), (1914) 27 MLJ 734.
17) Vaidyanathan v. Gangarazu (1290)
17 Mad. 9
18) M/s. Angile Insulations v.
M/s. Davy Ashmore India Ltd.
AIR 1995 SC 1766
19) Khemchand v. Dayaldas, (1942) Sind, 114.
20) Shaikh Kalu v. Ramsaran Bhagat (1909) 13 C.W.N. 388
21) Charles v. Macdonald (1899) 23 Bom. 103
22) Deshpande v. Arvind Mills, AIR 1946 Bom. 423
23) Jackson v Union Marine
Insurance (1874) 10 Common Pleas 125
[1]
Mr Justice Burrough noted "Public Policy is an unruly horse, and when you
get astride it you never know where it will carry you. It may lead you from
sound law. It is never argued at all but when other points fail” Richardson
v Mellish (1824) 2 Bing 228
[2] Richardson v. Mellish (1824)
2 Bing. 252
[3] Janson v. Driefontein
Consolidated Mines Ltd. (1902) A.C. 484
[4] Fender v.Mildmay[1937]
3 All E.R. 402
[5] Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd. (1973) 133 CLR 288
[6] Nordenfelt v Maxim Nordenfelt Guns and Ammunition Co Ltd
[1894] AC 535
[7] Amoco Australia Pty Ltd v Rocca Bros Motor Engineering Co Pty Ltd. (1973) 133 CLR 288
[8] Lindner v Murdock's Garage (1950) 83 CLR 628(Australia)
[9] Bhagwat Dayal Singh v. Debi
Dayal Sahu (1908) 35 I.A. 48: 35 Col. 4.
[10] Raja Venkata Subhadrayamma Guru v. Sree Pusapathi Venkatapathi Raju, 48 Mad. 230 (P.C.),
[11] Nuthaki Venkataswami v. Katta NagiReddy (died), AIR 1962 Andh Pra 457
[12] Equivalent citations:
1968 AIR 1273, 1968 SCR (3) 428
[13] Cited in St John Shipping
Corporation v Joseph Rank Ltd [1957] 1 QB 267.
[14] AIR 1986 SC 1636,(1986) 3 SCC
325 at 328
[15] Harwood v. Millers Timber &
Trading Co. [1917] 1 KB 305
[16] Giddu Narayanish v. Mrs.
Annie Besant. (1915) 38 Mad. P.C
[17] Also Equivalent Citation: AIR 1915 Mad 756 (2), (1914)
27 MLJ 734.
[19] M/s. Angile Insulations v. M/s. Davy Ashmore India Ltd. AIR 1995 SC 1766
[20] Khemchand v. Dayaldas, (1942)
Sind, 114.
[21] Shaikh Kalu v. Ramsaran Bhagat (1909) 13 C.W.N. 388
[22] Charles v. Macdonald (1899)
23 Bom. 103
[23] Deshpande v. Arvind
Mills, AIR 1946 Bom. 423
[24] Jackson v Union Marine Insurance (1874)
10 Common Pleas 125
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